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I. INTRODUCTION
{1}The rapid growth and sophistication of technology have changed the way people communicate. E-mail
and the Internet have begun to affect the way attorneys communicate with their clients. E-mail is fast and
convenient, but it is not without risks. The risk of illegal interception and the risk of inadvertent disclosure
are serious issues that attorneys need to be aware of and try to prevent so that the attorney-client privilege is
protected as much as possible. Although communicating with a client by e-mail may be risky, the risks posed
by e-mail are no different from those posed by communicating by postal mail, telephone, or fax machine.
{2}In an attempt to regulate telephonic communications, Congress passed the Federal Communications Act
of 1934 ("FCA").[1] With the development of the Internet and e-mail, new risks arose, and it became
necessary to regulate electronic communications. As a response, Congress passed the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA").[2] Although the district court in United States v. Keystone
Sanitation Company[3] encountered e-mail and the attorney-client privilege, the court failed to explain fully
and adequately the implications and effects of e-mail on the attorney-client privilege.
{3}This note explores the implications of e-mail for the attorney-client privilege. Part II presents the basic
elements of the attorney-client privilege and explains why the privilege is important. Part III introduces the
ECPA, and Part IV gives a brief background on the development of the Internet and e-mail, explains the
different types of e-mail systems, compares and contrasts e-mail with other forms of communication, and
discusses the benefits of e-mail. In addition, Part V presents the history and issues involved in United States v.
Keystone Sanitation Company. Finally, Part VI examines the current state of the law regarding e-mail and the
attorney-client privilege, and provides a summary and conclusion of the main points of this note.
II. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
{4}The conversations shared, information exchanged, and advice offered between an attorney and his client
generally fall under the attorney-client privilege. Information considered privileged need not be disclosed to
an opposing party during the discovery process. According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[p]arties
may obtain discovery regarding any matter not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action ..."[4] In addition, the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
indicate that an attorney may not disclose any information concerning a client's case, unless the client has
authorized disclosure or disclosure is necessary to represent the client.[5] Generally,
[t]he attorney-client privilege arises (1) [w]here legal advice of any
kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as
such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in

confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8)
except the protection be waived.[6]
However, because the privilege is in opposition to the notion that all evidence should be available so that the
investigation for truth is successful, the privilege "ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible
limits consistent with the logic of its principle."[7]
{5}The purpose of the attorney-client privilege, which is the oldest confidential communications privilege
recognized by the common law,[8] is to promote open and honest communications between attorneys and
clients.[9] In order to give clients complete and accurate information and advice, attorneys must be fully
informed.[10] Knowing that communications are privileged may encourage clients to divulge pertinent
information that they may be unwilling or afraid to share absent the privilege. Since disclosure undermines
the confidentiality of the communication, the privilege is usually waived if the information is disclosed to a
third party.[11]
III. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT (ECPA)
{6}Prior to Congress passing the ECPA[12] in 1986, the FCA prohibited unauthorized publication or use of
radio or telephone communications.[13] The development of the Internet and e-mail made it necessary to
pass the ECPA so that electronic communications would also be protected. The ECPA prohibits the
interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications.[14] Specifically prohibited acts
include: "intentionally intercept[ing], endeavor[ing] to intercept, or procur[ing] any other person to intercept
or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication."[15] The ECPA expressly states that
"no otherwise privileged wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted ... shall lose its privileged
character."[16]
IV. ELECTRONIC MAIL
A. Brief Overview of the Internet and E-mail

{7}The Internet grew out of a U.S. Department of Defense project. Originally called the "ARPANET," the
Internet was developed starting in 1969 by the Advanced Research Project Agency. It was designed to ease
the sharing of information between researchers at various universities and in the military. Additionally, the
Internet was also meant to assure that communication could continue during a nuclear attack.[17] The
Internet is a vast network connecting many different "host" computers, each having their own address for
sending and receiving e-mail.[18]
{8}E-mail is "a document created or received on an electronic mail system including brief notes, more formal
or substantive narrative documents, and any attachments, such as word processing and other electronic
documents, which may be transmitted with the message."[19] When e-mail messages are sent, they travel
through various routes and are broken up into separate segments, called "packets," before arriving in the
recipient's e-mail mailbox.[20] There are four different types of e-mail systems: direct e-mail, private e-mail,
on-line service provider, and Internet access provider. Each system requires users to have a username and a
password in order to access their individual e-mail accounts and to receive and send messages.
B. Types of E-mail Systems

1. Direct E-mail

{9}Direct e-mail requires that the sender directly dial the receiver's modem. The modem puts the e-mail

message into digital form before transferring the message through phone lines to the receiver's modem. The
receiver's modem then translates the digital information back into language format so that it is readable by the
receiver.[21] The information is in digital form as it travels through the phone lines, so intercepting and
reading information on direct e-mail systems is more difficult than intercepting other types of
communication.[22]
2. Private E-mail

{10}There are two types of private e-mail systems: internal corporate e-mail systems and "extranet"
networks. Internal corporate e-mail systems permit only internal access. "Extranet" networks involve one
private network directly dialing another private network.[23] The attorney-client privilege may arise in the
context of private e-mail systems when an attorney discusses a client's case over e-mail with another attorney
who is internally connected to the same private system, or when a corporation's in-house counsel
communicates by e-mail with a member of the corporation who is the client.[24] The American Bar
Association ("ABA") and various state bar associations all indicate that private e-mail systems maintain
confidentiality since the messages travel directly from one computer on a private network to another
computer on the same private network. Additionally, even if a message on a private network is intercepted or
inadvertently received by an unintended party, all attorneys and/or employees with access to the network are
obligated to maintain confidentiality for all of the firm's clients.[25]
3. On-line Service Provider

{11}On-line service providers issue passwords to users who then access e-mail accounts from which the
users can send and receive messages. User mailboxes are maintained by the on-line service provider in a
public forum, although each individual mailbox is protected by password. Thus, even though individuals
have private mailboxes accessible only by password, messages could inadvertently be delivered to the
mailbox of another user.[26]
{12}Unlike private in-house e-mail systems, in which all users owe a duty of confidentiality, most people
who utilize on-line service providers owe no duty of confidentiality to other users of the on-line service
provider.[27] In addition, the policy of the individual on-line service provider affects how secure the system
is. Depending on its policy, the on-line service provider's system administrator may be permitted to access
and examine certain e-mail messages.[28] Such inspection is regulated and restricted by federal law.[29]
4. Internet Access Provider

{13}E-mail can also be sent over the Internet without utilizing an on-line service provider. Instead, Internet
access providers are used to get messages to their destinations.[30] Each user has a local Internet access
provider. The local Internet access provider "connects with a larger Internet provider ... [and] [t]hat provider
may, in turn, connect to an even larger provider."[31] Like on-line service providers, Internet access providers
may reserve the right to inspect e-mail and may also randomly monitor messages.[32]
C. E-mail Compared and Contrasted with Other Methods of Communication

{14}Attorneys have a duty to protect the confidentiality of client information and to protect confidential
information from being misused or inadvertently disclosed. Confidential client information must be
"acquired, stored, retrieved, and transmitted under systems and controls that are reasonably designed and
managed to maintain confidentiality."[33] Therefore, in order to protect the attorney-client privilege,
attorneys are required to use methods of communication through which they can "reasonably" expect
confidentiality to be maintained.[34]

1. U.S. Postal Mail

{15}The U.S. Postal Service is considered "reasonably" secure, and is therefore a common and acceptable
method of attorney-client communications.[35] In many ways, sending e-mail is like sending a letter through
the U.S. Postal Service. Letters, which are addressed to specific recipients, pass through various hands in
many different places before arriving at their destination. It is possible that someone other than the intended
recipient could open the letter and read the information. It is also possible that the letter could be
inadvertently delivered to the wrong person. Similarly, e-mail messages pass through many different routes
before reaching their destination, and it is possible that e-mails may be intercepted or retrieved by someone
other than the intended recipient.
{16}Despite the similarities between letters sent via the U.S. Postal Service and messages sent via e-mail,
letters are generally considered more secure than e-mail messages since letters are sealed.[36] On the other
hand, both the U.S. Post Office and many on-line service providers reserve the right to inspect the letters or
messages sent through their service. Thus, neither postal mail nor e-mail guarantee absolute privacy.
{17}In addition, unlike letters that are sent as one complete document, e-mail messages are generally
transmitted to the recipient in "packets." The "packets" are then put together to form the message once they
reach their destination.[37] Since e-mail messages are not sent as single, complete documents, it is very
difficult to intercept all the "packets" and put them all together to from the actual message.[38] In contrast,
letters, which are sent as single documents, allow an interceptor access to the complete document.
2. Telephones

{18}The American Bar Association has specifically stated that "a lawyer has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the use of a telephone."[39] Using a telephone to communicate with a client does not breach the
attorney-client privilege. Intercepting and reading information on e-mail systems (especially on direct e-mail
systems) is generally more difficult than intercepting and eavesdropping on telephone conversations because,
unlike phone conversations, the information in e-mail messages is in digital form as it travels through the
phone lines. Decoding this digital message requires more skill than would be required to intercept a phone
call.
3. Fax Machines

{19}A fax machine is considered a "reasonably" secure method of communication.[40] The process of
sending information by e-mail is practically indistinguishable from the process of sending a fax.[41] Since email uses the same type of digital transmitting system as fax machines use, and since faxes are protected by
the attorney-client privilege, e-mails should also be protected by the attorney-client privilege.[42]
{20}Despite the similarities in the process of sending an e-mail message and sending a fax, differences do
exist. One difference is that e-mail messages are stored during transmission.[43] An e-mail is stored by the
private network, the on-line service provider, or the Internet access provider. Additionally, once the e-mail
reaches its destination, it is saved on the recipient's network. Deleting the message from the recipient's e-mail
mailbox does not necessarily mean that the message is completely erased from the network. Since many law
firms periodically "back-up" the information on their networks, information that is deleted from individual
mailboxes and from the network may still be found on a "back-up" disk.[44] Unlike e-mail messages, faxes
are not stored or saved; they are printed out as soon as they travel through the phone line to their destination.
{21}Another difference between e-mails and faxes is that inadvertently sending information to an unintended
recipient is generally much easier to do when using a fax machine. Sending a fax requires entering a sevendigit number. Just as entering one incorrect digit will result in calling someone different on the telephone,
entering one incorrect digit will result in the fax printing out on an unintended recipient's fax machine.[45]

{22}On the other hand, each e-mail user has a specific address. Without the exact e-mail address, information
cannot be transmitted by e-mail.[46] Interchanging letters or numbers that comprise the e-mail address, or
entering an incorrect letter or number into the address is more likely to result in the message being returned to
the user because it was undeliverable. Finally, e-mail addresses often contain the name of the recipient. This
makes it less likely that the intended recipient's e-mail address will be accidentally confused with a different
recipient's e-mail address.[47] In contrast, fax numbers do not contain the intended recipient's name and
could be easily confused with an unintended recipient's fax number.
D. Benefits of E-mail

{23}E-mail has become very popular partly because of the advantages it offers over other methods of
communication. One advantage is convenience. The sender can type an e-mail message and send it at any
time, regardless of whether the intended recipient is also using e-mail at the same time or is available at that
time. The message will be sent and stored until the recipient retrieves it. In contrast, using the telephone or a
fax machine may result in receiving a busy signal and being unable to contact the recipient.
{24}Another advantage is that e-mail allows the sender to sit at his desk and transmit information to anyone
in the world in a short amount of time.[48] E-mail also allows the user to correct and edit outgoing
documents quickly and easily. Faxes, on the other hand, require retyping the entire document in order to
make corrections. E-mail also provides the benefit of easy access of stored material. Storing paper documents
takes up more room than storing the same documents on a hard drive or a disk. Finally, e-mail is generally
more inexpensive and cost-effective than other forms of communication. Sending a one-page fax can cost as
much as sending one page by first class mail. However, for the same price a person could send about 100
pages over e-mail.[49]
V. UNITED STATES V. KEYSTONE SANITATION COMPANY
A. Background

1. Keystone I

{25}In Keystone I,[50] the United States filed suit against the Keystone Sanitation Company and ten other
defendants to recover money spent by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") for cleaning up a
contaminated landfill site pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act ("CERCLA").[51] In particular, the Keystone I court dealt with the United States' motion to
dismiss the defendants' counterclaims. The court ultimately granted the motion to dismiss some of the
counterclaims, but denied the motion for other counterclaims.[52]
2. Keystone II

{26}In Keystone II,[53] the court examined the claims of the other defendants who were also held
responsible for clean up costs. The other defendants claimed that Keystone distributed and disposed of its
assets in order to avoid paying its share of the CERCLA liability.[54] To establish that Keystone transferred
assets in order to avoid CERCLA liability, the other defendants requested production of all documents related
to the transfer of assets since the time the EPA began investigating Keystone. In particular, the other
defendants requested attorneys' billing statements dealing with the transfer of Keystone assets.[55]
{27}Keystone produced printouts of e-mail messages containing attorneys' billing statements and e-mail
printouts indicating that Keystone's attorneys were giving Keystone legal advice about how to transfer assets
out of the corporation.[56] Keystone claimed that the documents were protected by the attorney-client

privilege. The other defendants claimed that since Keystone included printouts of the e-mail messages when
they produced prior documents, the attorney-client privilege was waived.[57] Keystone insisted that the
privilege was not waived since the disclosure was inadvertent.[58]
{28}The Keystone II court explained that attorney billing statements "are protected by the attorney-client
privilege only to the extent that they reveal litigation strategy and/or the nature of services performed."
[59] Since the Keystone billing statements contain information about the nature of services performed, the
court indicated that the documents would be "protected by the attorney-client privilege, absent a waiver."
[60] Ultimately, the court held that Keystone waived the attorney-client privilege by providing the documents
at a previous time. Keystone, therefore, had to produce all attorney billing statements related to the
distribution of assets.[61]
{29}The court used the following factors to reach its conclusion that the documents lost their privilege
through inadvertent disclosure:
(1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent
disclosure in view of the extent of the document production; (2) the
number of inadvertent disclosures; (3) the extent of the disclosure; (4)
any delay and measure taken to rectify the disclosure; and (5)
whether the overriding interests of justice would or would not be
served by relieving a party of its error.[62]
The court concluded that the "balance of these factors weighs in favor of holding that ... Keystone ...waived
any privilege that may have protected their attorneys' billing statements from disclosure."[63]
{30}As to the first factor, the court explained that Keystone's precautions were not reasonable since Keystone
did not assert any privilege before it began producing documents.[64] Furthermore, according to the court,
the second and third factors, which looked at the number and extent of disclosures, also support
waiver. Although only two documents were actually in question, "the extent of the disclosure in these
documents is complete."[65] Both documents contain the exact type of information that the other defendants
were trying to get through their request for attorney billing statements. Therefore, despite the small number of
documents, the extent of disclosure in those documents supports waiving the attorney-client privilege.
{31}The fourth factor, delay or measures taken to rectify disclosure, is not "significantly implicated" since
the parties began arguing about waiver soon after the court ordered document production.[66] Finally, the
fifth factor, which involved the interests of justice, also supports the conclusion that the Keystone documents
lost their privilege through inadvertent disclosure. The goal of CERCLA is to make liable parties accountable
for their share of cleanup costs. Discovery of evidence indicating that a party has dissipated assets in an
attempt to avoid liability is contrary to that goal. Thus, the interests of justice require that Keystone's
attorney-client privilege be waived for information regarding attorneys' billing statements that have been
inadvertently disclosed.[67]
{32}The court concluded that the balance of the five factors resulted in a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege for attorneys' billing statements in this case. Even though the privilege would normally have
protected Keystone's documents, the inadvertent disclosure caused a waiver of the privilege.[68]
3. Keystone III

{33}In Keystone III[69] the court explained and clarified the Keystone II judgment. Keystone III reiterated
that attorney billing statements are privileged if they reveal litigation strategy or the nature of the services
performed. However, the Keystone III court explained that "it is the actual content of the document, rather
than the type of document, that is privileged."[70]
{34}Since Keystone had revealed, albeit inadvertently, a category of information concerning Keystone's
attorney communications, the attorney-client privilege was deemed waived regarding that particular category

of information.[71] Keystone III [72] reviewed the factors for waiver of the privilege through inadvertent
disclosure, and affirmed the decision of Keystone II.[73]
4. Keystone IV and Keystone V

{35}In Keystone IV[74] the court used the printed e-mail messages as part of the evidence showing that
Keystone was disposing of assets in an attempt to avoid paying its share of the CERCLA liability.
[75] Finally, in Keystone V,[76] the court granted the defendants' cross-motions for summary judgment on the
issue of whether the company who purchased Keystone Sanitation Company is liable for Keystone's
CERCLA cleanup costs.[77]
B. Evaluation

1. Treat E-mail The Same As Other Documents

{36}Keystone is significant since it treats e-mail just like any other document, at least for purposes of the
attorney-client privilege. The Keystone court allowed discovery of e-mail messages that were
printed. Additionally, the court stated that the e-mail printouts would be protected by the attorney-client
privilege, absent a waiver. Thus, according to Keystone, e-mail messages that have been printed out should be
treated like any other document that contains information encompassed by the attorney-client privilege.
2. Unanswered Questions

{37}Although Keystone indicates that, at least in certain circumstances, e-mail messages will be treated like
other documents for purposes of the attorney-client privilege, Keystone does not address whether e-mail is an
acceptable means of communicating confidential information.
{38}The question never arose since the e-mails between Keystone Sanitation Company and its attorneys had
been inadvertently disclosed as printouts rather than as electronic documents. Even though Keystone indicates
that it is the information itself rather than the type of document that matters for purposes of the attorney-client
privilege, the type of e-mail system used may affect whether e-mail is considered an acceptable method for
communicating attorney-client information. Since Keystone dealt with printed e-mail messages, the type of email system used was irrelevant because a printed e-mail message is just like any other document printed out
on paper. E-mails that are still in electronic form, however, are not all the same. The security of e-mail often
depends on the type of system used.[78]
{39}Regardless of the type of system, the safeguards and precautions utilized may also affect whether e-mail
is considered an acceptable method of communication. Keystone does not address whether additional
safeguards and precautions, such as encryption of e-mail messages, are required in order to protect
confidential information sent by e-mail.
{40}Since the Keystone court treats e-mail the same as other documents for purposes of the attorney-client
privilege, it may be inferred that the court considers e-mail a reasonable and acceptable method of
communication between attorneys and clients. The e-mail messages dealt with in Keystone, however, had
previously been printed and the printouts were inadvertently disclosed to third parties. Consider a situation in
which a confidential e-mail message has not been printed out, but instead has been inadvertently disclosed to
a third party while still in electronic form. It is not certain that Keystone would apply.
{41}Keystone did not involve, and the court did not address, the above situation in which an e-mail
containing confidential information remains in electronic form and is inadvertently sent to a third
party. However, the fact that an e-mail is still in electronic form should not prevent that e-mail from being

treated like any other document. According to Keystone, it is the content of the document, not the type of
document, that is privileged.[79] E-mail messages that have been inadvertently disclosed while in electronic
form should be evaluated using the same process the Keystone court used for the e-mail printouts: Is the
information of a type that is protected by the attorney-client privilege? If so, do the five factors for waiver
through inadvertent disclosure weigh in favor of waiving the privilege?[80]
{42}Ultimately, though Keystone treated the e-mail printouts like any other document for purposes of the
attorney-client privilege, the case leaves many questions unanswered. Keystone does provide some support
for the proposition that e-mail should be treated like conventional forms of communication. However,
Keystone does not explain whether e-mail should be treated like other methods of communication in all
situations, or only where the e-mail has been printed out. Keystone, therefore, clarifies only one aspect of the
implications of e-mail for the attorney-client privilege. The other aspects must be derived from other sources,
such as ABA opinions, state bar association opinions, the ECPA, and the limited number of other cases that
have dealt with e-mail.
VI. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. Case Law and the ECPA

{43}The exact implications of e-mail for the attorney-client privilege are not completely clear. To the extent
that the courts have dealt with e-mail, they often treat it in the same way that they treat other documents. The
Keystone court treated e-mail printouts just like other documents for purposes of determining whether the
attorney-client privilege was waived through inadvertent disclosure to a third party. Other courts have
conducted in camera inspection of various documents, including e-mail messages, and have decided which
documents were protected by the privilege and did not have to be disclosed.[81] This indicates that courts are
treating e-mail messages like conventional documents when determining whether the documents are
protected by the attorney-client privilege.
{44}The ECPA currently protects intercepted e-mail messages. The ECPA was passed to protect electronic
communications.[82] Based on the ECPA, e-mail communications remain privileged even if those
communications are illegally intercepted.[83] Since intercepting e-mail is illegal, and since intercepting email does not result in the e-mail losing its privileged status, intercepted e-mail messages remain privileged
despite the fact that a third party read them.
{45}Furthermore, since interception of electronic communications is prohibited under the ECPA, e-mail
communications between attorneys and clients should be considered "reasonably" secure for purposes of the
attorney-client privilege. Although the ECPA does not eliminate the possibility of illegal interception, it does
make interception a crime.[84] Therefore, since criminal penalties ensue if messages are illegally intercepted,
a person using e-mail should be able to rely on e-mail to provide a reasonable expectation of privacy. Simply
because it is possible to illegally intercept communications, such as e-mail messages or telephone calls, does
not mean that those methods of communication are automatically not acceptable for protection of the
attorney-client privilege.[85]
B. Ethical and Professional Responsibilities

{46}The consensus among state bar associations is that e-mail is a reasonable and acceptable means of
communication between attorneys and clients.[86] Even though the ABA and many state bar associations
consider e-mail a reasonable and acceptable means of attorney-client communication, and even if courts treat
e-mail messages just like other documents that may be protected by the attorney-client privilege, attorneys
need to be aware of their ethical and professional responsibilities in relation to e-mail. An awareness of those
responsibilities allows attorneys to make decisions that afford maximum protection of confidential
information and communications.

1. Duty to Protect Confidential Information

{47}ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(a) states that "a lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to representation of a client unless a client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation . . ."[87] Attorneys, therefore, have a duty to
protect client information and to prevent confidential information from being revealed.[88]
2. Duty to Obtain Client Consent

{48}All attorneys have a duty to obtain client consent before revealing any confidential client information,
regardless of the method of communication used.[89] Additionally, some state bar associations recommend
that attorneys get client consent before sending confidential information by e-mail.[90] Not only is client
consent one way to reduce the risk of malpractice liability,[91] obtaining client consent reduces the
possibility of sacrificing the attorney-client privilege.[92] In order to obtain the client's consent, the attorney
should discuss the attorney-client privilege with the client, explain the various methods of communication
available, identify the risks associated with each method of communication, and determine if the client
wishes to communicate by e-mail.[93]
3. Duty to Abide by the Client's Decision

{49}After discussing the attorney-client privilege with the client and obtaining the client's consent for
specific methods of transmission, the attorney has a duty to follow the client's decision as to what methods of
transmission may be used.[94] If a client wants to limit the type and/or amount of information transmitted by
e-mail, for instance, the attorney must abide by those limitations.
4. Duty to Use Communication Methods that Afford a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

{50}In addition to protecting confidential information, obtaining client consent prior to revealing confidential
client information, and abiding by the client's decision, attorneys also have a duty to use methods of
communication that afford a "reasonable expectation of privacy."[95] Thus, if the attorney is not sure of the
privacy afforded by a particular e-mail system, he may be better off using a different method to transmit the
information.[96] However, even though an e-mail system may not be absolutely secure,[97] it may still be
used. As long as the system is deemed reasonably secure, it is an acceptable method of communicating client
information.[98]
C. Safeguards

{51}Many state bar association opinions and bar journal articles indicate that e-mail is a reasonable and
acceptable means of communication.[99] Still, until the courts declare e-mail a reasonable and acceptable
method of communication, attorneys in all states must be aware of the safeguards that may be necessary in
order to protect the attorney-client privilege.
1. Encryption

{52}Encryption involves using mathematical functions to code an e-mail message. The mathematical
functions are then interpreted using a "key." The key ensures that the message is decoded only by the sender
and the intended recipient. Unencrypted e-mail messages look like regular, readable text. By encrypting the email and thereby putting it into a code, the message cannot be read unless the key is used to interpret the

code.[100]
{53}Although encryption will protect against inadvertent disclosure, encryption has some drawbacks. First,
the sender and all receiving parties must utilize the same software.[101] Second, the keys must be
programmed correctly in the sender's computer as well as in all recipients' computers in order for the
encrypted message to be decoded and read.[102] Third, encryption programs take up a large amount of
computer memory. Thus, a law firm with a number of attorneys using encryption on the same system may
experience a network overload.[103] Fourth, since encryption programs tend to be expensive, clients and
even some law firms may not be able to afford it.[104] Finally, even if all four of the previously discussed
drawbacks are overcome, encryption still may not guarantee privacy since even the best available encryption
systems can be "defeated."[105]
2. Disclaimer

{54}Including a disclaimer with each e-mail message may also protect the attorney-client privilege. A
disclaimer lets the recipient know that the e-mail message contains confidential information and that if the email is inadvertently sent to an unintended recipient, the e-mail should not be read, copied or forwarded.[106]
3. Digital Signature

{55}Digital signatures are another available option for protecting the attorney-client privilege. Digital
signatures "authenticate the identity of senders and receivers; ... protect the integrity of the documents,
insuring that [the] content has not been changed; and ... provide for encryption of documents and
communications."[107]
4. Password

{56}Making attached documents accessible only through use of a password is another safeguard for
protecting privileged documents.[108] The password prevents the document from being opened unless the
recipient enters the correct password.
5. Common Sense

{57}Although encryption, disclaimers, and passwords may help protect confidential information sent by email, attorneys should still use common sense when deciding whether to use e-mail to transmit
information. "A profession that prides itself on confidentiality should be careful about utilizing modes of
communication where the risk is difficult to assess."[109] If the attorney or client has any doubts about the
security of the e-mail system used, it may be best to transmit the information through some method other than
e-mail. Generally, the more confidential and sensitive the information is, the more protection it should be
afforded. Until the courts set definitive guidelines for using e-mail to transmit confidential information,
attorneys and clients may want to use a method other than e-mail to transmit highly confidential or highly
sensitive information.[110]
{58}Attorneys should also take a few moments before sending an e-mail to double check the address to
ensure that the message is going to the correct person.[111] Another precaution is to re-read the e-mail and
think about what was written. E-mail should be treated like a letter or a memo. This means that attorneys
should not allow the "informality" and "instantaneous nature" of e-mail to prompt them to express thoughts,
opinions, or insights that they would not express in a letter or memo.[112]
D. Conclusion

{59}Although the law is not completely clear on exactly how to handle the attorney-client privilege within
the context of e-mail messages, courts will be forced to address this issue in the future as it is likely that email will continue to be used in the practice of law. The novelty and uncertainty surrounding the Internet may
make electronic communications seem more risky than other forms of communication, such as telephones
and faxes, that have been used in the past and are more commonplace. Since the risks are essentially the
same, however, e-mail should not be treated any differently than postal mail, telephones, and faxes for
purposes of the attorney-client privilege.
{60}Ultimately, no method of communication guarantees absolute confidentiality. E-mail, postal mail,
telephone, and fax communications are not completely secure; each of them may be lost, intercepted, or
inadvertently disclosed to an unintended third party. The security of e-mail messages largely depends on the
type of system used [113] and on how careful the sender is about checking to make sure the address is
correct.[114] The risk that information may be intercepted does not mean that e-mail messages should not be
privileged. Postal mail, telephone conversations, and faxes are also susceptible to interception, but they
remain privileged. E-mail should be treated the same way.[115]
{61}Courts may be wary of e-mail and the new technology involved with it. However, "[e]ach time new
technology is introduced, the courts have been wary. Six hundred years ago, paper was rejected as a means of
commerce, although it eventually replaced parchment for legal use."[116] Until the courts indicate acceptance
of e-mail and declare it a "reasonably" secure method of communication for the protection of confidentiality,
attorneys and clients should take precautions when using e-mail for confidential communications.
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